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ABSTRACT 
The Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE) has been developed as the 
joint force solution to provide a single training environment for cyberspace operations. 
PCTE offers a closed network for Joint Cyberspace Operations Forces, which provides a 
range of training solutions from individual sustainment training to mission rehearsal and 
post-operation analysis. Currently, PCTE does not have the ability to replay previously 
executed training scenarios or external scenarios. Replaying cyber mission data on a 
digital twin virtual network within PCTE would support operator training as well as 
enable development and testing of new strategies for offensive and defensive cyberspace 
operations. A necessary first step in developing such a tool is to acquire network 
specifications for a target network, or to extract network specifications from a cyber 
mission data set. This research developed a program design and proof-of-concept tool, 
Automated Cyber Operations Mission Data Replay (ACOMDR), to extract a portion of 
the network specifications necessary to instantiate a digital twin network within PCTE 
from cyber mission data. From this research, we were able to identify key areas for future 
work to increase the fidelity of the network specification and replay cyber events within 
PCTE. 
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Creating a virtual computing environment that is an exact duplicate, or “digital 
twin,” of a physical computing environment enables researchers, cyber operators, and 
trainees to simulate real-world scenarios in controlled environments. Such a digital twin 
can be used to replay cyber mission data (CMD) for the purposes of operator training, to 
practice defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and to learn new strategies for offensive 
cyberspace operations (OCO). A recently developed environment that has the capability to 
host a digital twin system is the Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE). 
PCTE has been developed as the joint force solution to provide a single training 
environment for cyberspace operations (CO). The PCTE offers a closed network for Joint 
Cyberspace Operations Forces to utilize for training and enables a range of training 
solutions spanning individual sustainment training to mission rehearsal. Having been 
operational for approximately one year, the PCTE is currently undergoing further 
development to refine its available capabilities. Currently, the PCTE does not have the 
capability to replay cyber mission events captured outside of the PCTE environment. 
Introducing the capability to replay real-world cyber missions will enable operators to 
conduct more detailed after-action reviews, and to conduct more realistic and relevant 
training scenarios and analysis of CO. Replaying mission data can also introduce the 
capability to modify specific parameters within the mission data, which would allow for 
cost-benefit analysis of different software, hardware, or tactics experienced during the 
cyber mission. 
The purpose of this research is to begin the development of an embedded tool that 
will allow users to replay cyber mission events in a dynamic fashion and provide enhanced 
visualization of transpired events within PCTE. This tool is designed to increase a user’s 
situational awareness of the cyber battlespace and integrate with current and future 
capabilities hosted within the PCTE and service specific data repositories. The tool will 
leverage the PCTE’s ongoing development to allow for rapid deployment to the joint 
cyberspace operating forces and future expansion of capabilities. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study addresses the following research questions:  
1. Primary Question 
How can the relevant network specifications be extracted from log data to 
instantiate a digital twin network? 
2. Secondary Questions 
How can log data be converted to scripts to be executed on a digital twin 
network? 
What are the desirable features of a run-time environment to control the 
execution of cyber mission scripts? 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis reviews previous cyberspace training solutions to develop a proof-of-
concept tool to extract network specifications from CMD and to set conditions to replay 
CMD on a digital twin network. The focus of this study is to analyze CMD logs provided 
by Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER) and develop a 
software environment to process and extract network specifications to instantiate a digital 
twin network on the PCTE.  
The project was divided into two phases. The first phase consisted of researching, 
collecting, and analyzing CO training environments and CMD logs to extract network 
configuration data to instantiate a digital twin network within the PCTE infrastructure. The 
second phase consisted of developing software to process the CMD logs and construct a 
network specification from the CMD. The tool built in this thesis allows for future 
development and integration with both existing PCTE capabilities and external data 
repositories. 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
One of the foundations of winning battles is maintaining comprehensive situational 
awareness of the battlespace. Cyberspace is a uniquely challenging battlespace in that 
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cyberspace operations are conducted in abstract digital environments, which introduces 
new complexities to developing and maintaining situational awareness. This research has 
begun the development of new capabilities to enhance visualization of CO by instantiating 
a digital twin of an operational network for replaying the events that transpired during a 
mission. Since the PCTE is still undergoing regular updates, the possibility of near-term 
incorporation into the operational PCTE is high. Creating a digital twin network and 
replaying mission data would support operator training as well as developing and testing 
new strategies for OCO and DCO. 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
1. Chapter II: Background 
Chapter II provides a general background to military cyberspace operations. This 
chapter describes the development and capabilities of the PCTE and covers applicable 
terms relating to digital twin network environments. Chapter II concludes with a summary 
of current cyberspace training solutions and current examples of CMD collection tools. 
2. Chapter III: Methodology and System Design 
Chapter III defines the system design of the proof-of-concept tool developed in this 
thesis. The system design is broken down into eight steps: data collection, data sourcing, 
user interface, data processing, database design, network builder module, event manager 
module, and finally the CMD replay visualization component of the tool. 
3. Chapter IV: Test System Implementation and Results 
Chapter IV describes the development, testing, and results of the proof-of-concept 
CMD replay tool. This chapter begins with a step-by-step approach to implement the 
current application and a description of the programming environment. The chapter 
concludes with a description of the various tests conducted and an analysis of the output of 
the tool. 
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4. Chapter V: Conclusions and Future Work 
Chapter V summarizes the work of this thesis, examines the results of the proof-of-
concept tool, and makes recommendations for future research and design modifications to 




Cyberspace embodies the interconnectedness of global digital technology, ranging 
from personal computing devices and vast data centers to processers and controllers across 
the Internet. Cyberspace is unique in that it transcends the physical domain and has both 
logical and social characteristics that add layers of complexity to CO. Our dependence on 
cyberspace continues to increase with the growing use of smart devices, the ease of access 
to the Internet of Things, and the interweaving of digital capabilities in industrial, 
commercial, government, and private sectors. This reliance on digital technologies is 
increasing the importance of governing and securing cyberspace. 
Military operations have greatly expanded with their integration of and dependence 
on cyberspace. It is becoming more difficult for commanders to develop situational 
awareness of the operating environment as cyberspace plays a more significant role across 
the range of military operations. Commanders must evaluate their unit’s cyberspace 
security and integrity as they are becoming more reliant on cyberspace to control operations 
in both the physical and cyberspace domains. Commanders are also becoming 
progressively more vulnerable to cyberspace exploitation, making cyberspace a critical 
vulnerability. 
In this chapter, we assess the growing significance of U.S. CO and the necessity for 
advanced training and modeling solutions in cyberspace and we review present-day CO 
training and modeling frameworks. 
A. NECESSITY OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defined cyberspace as an operational 
domain in July 2011, marking a shift in national military strategy that placed increased 
emphasis on CO [1]. As U.S. military operations in cyberspace continued to grow in 
significance, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was elevated to the level of a 
unified combatant command (COCOM) in August 2017 [2]. As a COCOM, 
USCYBERCOM now plays a larger role in characterizing the cyberspace operating 
environment. In USCYBERCOM’s 2018 command vision, adversaries are credited with 
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molding a “new normal” of operations below the threshold of armed conflict that 
capitalizes on U.S. constraints and vulnerabilities [3]. USCYBERCOM recognizes the 
asymmetric nature of CO, which gives disproportionate capabilities to traditionally under-
resourced actors. USCYBERCOM’s command vision defines a methodology for how the 
U.S. plans to combat near-peer and asymmetric threats, highlighting the concepts of 
superiority through persistence and defending forward, where the metric for success is 
measured by decreased adversarial aggression and increased options for commands [3]. 
USCYBERCOM and researchers recognize that nation states, both adversary and ally, 
continue to increase their investments in CO, signifying a growing role in states’ national 
security strategies [3], [4]. 
The three primary missions of USCYBERCOM are defending military networks, 
supporting the joint force with CO, and defending the nation from cyberspace attacks [5]. 
Their framework for accomplishing these missions is the Joint Cyber Warfighting 
Architecture (JCWA), designed to provide “a comprehensive, integrated cyberspace 
architecture to achieve and sustain the insight, agility, and lethality necessary for 
maintaining a competitive advantage against near-peer adversaries” [6]. The JCWA is 
composed of five components: 
• common firing platforms at [USCYBERCOM’s] four cyber operating 
locations (each operated and employed by Service cyber components) 
using a comprehensive suite of cyber tools; 
• a “Unified Platform” for integrating and analyzing data from both 
offensive and defensive cyber operations with intelligence and partners 
(including the private sector); 
• joint command and control mechanisms for situational awareness and 
battle management at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; 
• sensors that support defense of the network and drive operational 
decisions; 
• and a Persistent Cyber Training Environment where teams can train and 
even rehearse missions under realistic conditions. [7] 
The PCTE is designed to be interoperable with all of the JCWA components and to 
facilitate training and rehearsals of CO using the available tools and capabilities [6]. The 
purpose of this thesis research was to develop additional capabilities within PCTE to 
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enhance modelling, simulation, and operator training in a virtual environment, a domain 
identified as being critical to the advancement of CO [4].  
B. PERSISTENT CYBER TRAINING ENVIRONMENT 
As outlined by USCYBERCOM, there is a strategic demand for a cyber-
architecture that provides a realistic and adaptable training environment for cyberspace 
operators to train at the individual, team, and force level [6], [7]. Previously, service 
components operated independently and provided disjoint training solutions that often 
resulted in training scenarios, data, or resources that were redundant between services or 
did not persist between training evolutions. PCTE provides a joint training solution to these 
shortfalls and is advertised as a tool to “rapidly create ‘Digital Twins’ that replicate 
cyberspace operational environments in a virtualized platform for the [Cyber Mission 
Force (CMF)] to execute realistic training and mission rehearsals” [8]. 
PCTE is addressed in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
evaluating the training and sustainment of the CMF, which states that the goal of PCTE is 
to “provide on-demand access” to an environment that has been built to “enhance the 
quality, quantity, and standardization of phase three (collective) and phase four 
(sustainment) training and exercise events” [9]. Four training phases, depicted in Figure 1, 
characterize the sequencing of CMF training. Phase one is largely generic, being 
established and administered by individual services, and only provides general military 
knowledge. Phases two through four were developed by USCYBERCOM to specifically 
develop the desired skillsets of a CMF operator, reinforcing joint training concepts across 
the range of capabilities in the cyberspace domain. 
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Figure 1. Cyber Mission Force training model phases. Source: [9]. 
The development of PCTE is ongoing as designers have adopted the agile software 
development process with new versions released approximately every six months [10]. 
While this process means PCTE is undergoing frequent changes, it allows for regular user 
feedback to be incorporated into future releases. Given the volatility of CO, the agile 
development process allows for a high degree of adaptability and relevancy to the evolving 
cyberspace environment. 
PCTE is accessed via a web application from anywhere in the world and hosts a 
variety of web-based applications consisting of training courses, cyber ranges, and 
configurable virtual environments. It is currently hosted by the Army Project Manager for 
Cyber, Test, and Training (PM CT2) under the umbrella of the Program Executive Officer 
for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI). PCTE is composed of over 150 
virtual machines (VM) and Remote Compute Storage (RCS) servers installed at various 
locations across the U.S., facilitating disaggregate use by the CMF [10].  
Traditional cyber training environments have largely relied on cyber ranges for 
research, development, and exercises. Cyber ranges are designed to simulate networks and 
systems in an isolated and controlled environment; however, they potentially lack the 
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ability to integrate function as a “complex cyber-physical environment with unexpected 
dependencies and consequences” [11]. This novel concept has been defined as a Cyber 
Arena, an environment that facilitates extensive modeling of the cyber ecosystem, and is 
composed of the following requirements:  
1. realism; 
2. isolated and controlled environment; 
3. Internet simulation; 
4. user and network traffic generation; 
5. attack execution and simulation; 
6. organizations’ infrastructures; 
7. collaboration; 
8. and planning, executing, monitoring, and analyzing [11]. 
PCTE is currently undergoing development using an “evolutionary architecture” to 
connect its current capabilities to “real world physical security assets,” such as industrial 
control systems, that are not suitable for emulation [8]. By connecting PCTE to these assets, 
the DOD will have the ability to create a fully interoperable digital twin environment 
through PCTE and created a Cyber Arena [8]. 
C. DIGITAL TWIN 
Although the digital twin concept was first introduced in the early 2010s, there is a 
degree of ambiguity that is still associated with the term [12]. For this thesis, we define the 
term digital twin as well as important concepts surrounding its use. 
1. Definition 
A digital twin can be defined as a “complete virtual description of a physical 
product that is accurate to both micro and macro level” [13]. This definition incorporates a 
broad perspective of the term where a virtual entity, or a digital representation of a physical 
construct, exists within a virtual environment, and the virtual entity and virtual 
environment duplicate that of their physical counterparts with the highest fidelity. While 
the physical environment corresponds to a “real-world” domain, the virtual environment 
exists within the digital domain [13]. Furthermore, there is a two-way connection between 
the virtual and physical components that facilitates a twinning, or synchronization, process. 
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This provides a continuous feedback cycle that allows for both the physical and virtual 
environments to interact and sustain accurate mirroring in near real-time. 
2. Fidelity 
The fidelity of a digital twin is an important concept that can have a variety of 
impacts on a digital twin system. Fidelity is best described as “the number of parameters 
transferred between the physical and virtual entities, their accuracy, and their level of 
abstraction” [13]. A high degree of fidelity in a digital twin system is the desired end state; 
however, the degree of fidelity varies widely depending on the software and techniques 
used to generate the virtual components of the digital twin system. 
3. Emulation vs. Simulation 
Virtualization is “the application of the layering principle through enforced 
modularity, whereby the exposed virtual resource is identical to the underlying physical 
resource being virtualized” [14]. Virtualization is the result of multiplexing, aggregation, 
and emulation, the latter defined as a “level of indirection in software to expose a virtual 
resource or device that corresponds to a physical device” [14]. 
A virtual machine is “a complete compute environment with its own isolated 
processing capabilities, memory, and communication channels” [14]. A virtual machine is 
characterized as one of three disjoint abstractions: a language-based virtual machine such 
as Java Virtual Machine (JVM) or Microsoft Common Language Runtime; a lightweight 
virtual machine such as Docker or Denali; or a system-level virtual machine that will run 
as a fully isolated instance [14]. System-level virtual machines are run on either a 
hypervisor or a machine simulator platform, where machine simulation is defined as being 
“implemented as a normal user-level application, with the goal of providing an accurate 
simulation of the virtualized architecture” [14]. It is important to identify the distinction 
between simulation and emulation with respect to virtualization, as the different 
methodologies can have a significant impact on modeling speed and system design. 
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D. CURRENT CYBER OPERATIONS TRAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND 
LIMITATIONS 
The tools available to train and evaluate cyber operators have evolved along with 
the expansion of this domain. There is a range of private and government training solutions 
and learning environments, which span the range from traditional computer-based training 
to immersive and adaptive digital environments. This section aims to summarize the 
current state of training solutions offered for cyberspace professionals. 
1. CERT 
The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), a division under the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University, is a federally funded research 
and development center that, through public and private sponsorship, seeks to advance 
cyberspace security, training, and analysis capabilities. Investigators at CERT have 
implemented a continuous four-phase workforce development model designed to improve 
upon traditional classroom-based training models. The four phases – Knowledge Building, 
Skill Building, Experience Building, and Evaluation – leverage virtual environments to 
deliver adaptable and relevant training scenarios [15]. CERT efforts to develop simulation 
and training capabilities for the purpose of developing the cyberspace workforce have 
resulted in two web-based platforms: the STEPfwd (Simulation Training Exercise 
Platform) platform, formerly known as XNET, developed as an experience and evaluation 
platform; and FedVTE (Federal Virtual Training Environment), developed for training and 
skills building [16]. 
The STEPfwd platform is capable of running network simulations with thousands 
of nodes and is designed to simulate a real-world environment [16]. STEPfwd is designed 
to support phases three (Experience Building) and four (Evaluation) of the CERT 
workforce development model [16]. Researchers at CERT are continuing to pursue 
increased realism within training and simulation platforms, as demonstrated by the 
development and implementation of CERT’s GHOSTS (General Hosts) framework. The 
GHOSTS framework produces network traffic from multiple instances of simulated-
human non-player characters (NPCs), each with its own unique cyberspace related goal 
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[17]. The GHOSTS framework was deployed on STEPfwd in a case study with three Cyber 
Protection Teams (CPT) between December of 2017 and April of 2018, and demonstrated 
the correlation between increased realism and increased training value [17].  
The FedVTE platform is a training and education platform that delivers cyber-based 
training courses and labs in information assurance and cybersecurity, and is advertised as 
a cost saving system, providing convenient access to federal employees to requisite training 
[16], [18]. It was developed by SEI in 2005 to resolve DOD information security training 
and capability shortcomings and is currently managed by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) with support from Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) [16]. 
FedVTE is designed to support phases one (Knowledge Building), two (Skill Building), 
and three (Experience Building) of the CERT workforce development model [16].  
2. MAST 
The Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) is a system developed by 
researchers at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to simulate malware on military networks 
for network operator training. MAST is not a standalone training environment, but is a 
program designed to be deployed on a target network. MAST was developed using a 
modular configuration composed of the Scenario Execution Server, the Scenario 
Generation Server, and the MAST client [19]. MAST is structured as a client-server model, 
where clients use a Java program to run modules at the direction of the Scenario Execution 
Server [19], [20]. A custom scenario scripting language and custom interpreter for the 
Scenario Execution Server was developed to facilitate continued remote development and 
deployment of scenarios [19]. 
MAST was designed to deploy on any network configuration by building in a layer 
of abstraction between client workstations and the authored scenario, which removes the 
necessity for mapping the network [19]. As a training tool, MAST leverages real-world 
networks to deploy scenarios that test network operators’ skill and knowledge, workstation 
configurations, such as antivirus settings, and network vulnerabilities, such as port 
scanning. MAST is currently configured to facilitate defensive training against simulated 
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malware, termed simware, however the modularity of MAST introduces many possibilities 
for developing DCO or OCO scenarios. 
3. UK Network Attack Simulation Environment 
Researchers from the United Kingdom (UK) developed a tool in 2017 that creates 
a configurable emulated network environment for DCO. Their (unnamed) tool generates a 
user-defined network of VMs using Netkit and replays network traffic to obfuscate 
malicious network traffic in training exercises [21]. Netkit is an open source network 
emulator utilizing a kernel derived from the Debian Linux Operating System (OS), which 
uses start-up scripts to configure the network interfaces and the lab environment. 
The UK researchers captured a range of network traffic while connected to the 
Internet using tcpdump, a command line packet analyzer. From this capture, they generated 
a categorized directional repository of all packets in PCAP format [21]. Using TCPReplay, 
an open source suite to edit and replay captured transmission control protocol (TCP) traffic, 
the researchers modified the PCAP files to make it appear that their origin was legitimate, 
and then replayed them at random using bash scripts [21]. 
The UK researchers developed a Python program that interacts with a user via a 
command line interface (CLI) to configure the network and subsequently interact with 
Netkit. While the authors do not evaluate the efficacy of their system in a DCO or OCO 
context, the system was designed for that specific purpose. Testing and evaluating the 
functionality of their tool was performed and deemed successful [21]. 
4. CRATE 
The Swedish Defense Research Agency developed the Cyber Range and Training 
Environment (CRATE) in 2008 as a platform for cyberspace exercises, competitions, and 
experiments. CRATE is composed of approximately 800 servers and has the capability to 
deploy thousands of VMs in various configurations [22]. Experimenters have implemented 
the open source VirtualBox hypervisor, developed by OraclePrior, on CRATE’s servers to 
manage scenario development and execution [23]. The system is configurable through the 
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VirtualBox interface and, while full automation is a clear goal of the researchers, human 
interaction is required through the duration of the exercise [23]. 
To enhance the training value of CRATE, in 2015, researchers developed and tested 
the CRATE Exercise Control (CEC) tool, an exercise management and support tool to 
enhance planning, execution, and evaluation of cyber defense exercises by interfacing with 
CRATE [24]. CEC interfaces with CRATE through reports submitted by players in 
CRATE, which in turn create new event threads within CEC; additionally, exercise 
administrators correlate reports to injects that serve to document and generate new event 
actions [24]. The developers of CEC emphasize the value of exercise- and experience-
based learning, which they attribute to enhanced learning outcomes. 
5. EVE and ADAM 
European researchers affiliated with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) have developed an 
application designed to improve situational awareness through visualization of the network 
topology and associated security alerts. The application, Events Visualization Environment 
(EVE), and a corresponding internal events aggregator module, the Advanced Data 
Aggregation Module (ADAM), were designed for and tested in two NATO CCDCOE 
exercises conducted in 2018 [25]. While not a standalone training environment, EVE and 
ADAM serve together as a toolset to visualize the configuration of networks from sensors 
composed of intrusion detection and protection systems, system logs monitoring tools, and 
deception techniques and tools [25]. 
The EVE application follows a modular configuration composed of five modules: 
• the Input Module, which receives incoming data from network sensors; 
• The ADAM module, which acts as an event correlator between events 
and alerts;  
• The Network Definition Module, which stores a static map of the 
network configured before running EVE; 
• The Graphical Interface Module, which displays the network map and 
alerts to users; 
• The Internal Control Module, which listens, transmits events to ADAM, 
maintains the event-alert correlation database, and transmits alerts to the 
Graphical Interface Module [25]. 
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The EVE application was developed using a Java Web Application, which allows 
for dynamic interaction with users through a static website, and capitalizes on HyperText 
Markup Language (HTML) version 5 to push alerts to the JavaScript application 
programming interface (API). Figure 2 depicts a notional representation of the EVE 
application depicting an alert of an attack on a network map. Once an alert is received, 
circles and arrows are drawn depicting the source and target of an attack as well as an 
informative popup. In Figure 2, node D2 is attacked by node 17 and the corresponding 
informative popup is displayed. 
 
Figure 2. Simplified representation of EVE user interface. Source: [25]. 
The EVE and ADAM applications underpin the importance of visualization in CO 
to increase situational awareness. The authors recognize further improvements to EVE and 
ADAM could be made to introduce more detail in alerts and the resulting visualization. 
Additional concerns addressing the network topologies were also addressed by the 
researchers. 
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6. Comparison of CO Technologies 
In this section, we have compared five different cyber training environments that 
have varying degrees of suitability for the training environments set forth by 
USCYBERCOM. Table 1 provides an evaluation and summary of the five cyber training 
environments relative to USCYBERCOM’s requirements of on-demand access, Phase III 
enhancement, and phase four training and exercise events. 




E. CYBER MISSION DATA OVERVIEW 
The term cyber mission data is inherently vague. One could generally classify all 
data collected during a cyber mission as being CMD, but this fails to characterize the type, 
scope, and purpose of the data. In general, CMD is typically structured data as it is 
commonly text output from software packages that are designed to monitor and capture 
varying degrees of network traffic. While certain CMD may be more unstructured in 
nature, such as tools that assemble packets into picture, audio, or video files, we focused 
on software packages that produce structured CMD. These software packages are 
commonly advertised as intrusion detection software (IDS) and intrusion prevention 
software (IPS). In this section, we introduce three software solutions that are currently used 
in the DOD. 
1. Assured Compliance Assessment Solution 
The Assured Compliance Assessment Solution (ACAS) is a DISA contract 
awarded to Perspecta (formerly HP Enterprise Services) and Tenable in 2012 to assess 
DOD networks against DOD standards while identifying known vulnerabilities [26]. 
According to a 2018 Tenable Whitepaper, the current ACAS solution includes the 
following commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products : 
• Tenable.sc (formerly SecurityCenter) for vulnerability, compliance, and 
event management; Tenable.sc functions as a client in a client server 
model in conjunction with Nessus Scanners, 
• Nessus Scanners function as a server that is controlled by the Tenable.sc 
platform, 
• Nessus Network Monitor (formerly Passive Vulnerability Scanner) is a 
packet level network discovery and vulnerability analysis tool designed to 
determine network topology, services, and vulnerabilities, 
• Nessus Agents allow for increased client deployment to enable expanded 
scan coverage of assets, 
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• Log Correlation Engine aggregates, normalizes, correlates, and analyzes 
enterprise log data by passing them, as well as IPS/IDS events, to 
Tenable.sc [26], [27]. 
ACAS is primarily structured in a defensive posture designed to identify threats 
through passive monitoring and active scanning. 
2. Host Based Security System 
The Host Based Security System (HBSS) is COTS software suite developed by 
McAfee that is utilized by the DOD. For HBSS to function, DOD workstations must run a 
host IPS that also connects with and allows system administrators to monitor threat alerts 
through the ePolicy Orchestrator. The HBSS suite also allows for the establishment of a 
performance baseline, enabling administrators to detect anomalous behavior as well as 
known malicious program signatures [28]. 
3. Joint Regional Security Stack 
The Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS) is a DOD solution intended to provide a 
broad range of network security capabilities by means of centralizing and standardizing 
network security architectures [29]. These capabilities are sourced from 36 different 
Original Equipment Manufacturers that offer services such as firewalls, IPS and IDS, 
enterprise management, and virtual routing and forwarding [29]. Relevant software 
solutions to capture CMD exist within the JRSS, such as Zeek. 
Zeek, formerly Bro until 2018, is a software package that is better described as a 
sensor vice an IPS or IDS [30]. Zeek observes network traffic and produces many different 
descriptive, and customizable, log files for subsequent analysis. Zeek is often employed in 
a manner that does not capture the payload of a packet, but instead extracts relevant 
information from packet headers to process into log files. Zeek logs such as conn.log, 
http.log, and dhcp.log are of particular value as they provide detailed information on 
established connections and network specifications. Zeek log file types and descriptions 
are summarized in Appendix A. 
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F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we reviewed the current state of CO in the U.S., the development 
and implementation of the PCTE, and the current state of the art in cyberspace training 
solutions. The current state of the art in cyberspace training environments offers a range of 
capabilities and resources to replicate real-world scenarios, heighten situational awareness 
of the battlefield, and increase training and readiness of personnel through high-fidelity 
digital twins. Key findings from these technologies emphasize the high degree of 
portability and API of the Java software platform, the value of graphical depictions of 
network actions for increased situational awareness, and consolidated training resources 
under a single host system. 
The PCTE has the capacity to offer all of these capabilities in a cohesive 
interoperable environment. Replaying CMD on a simulated operational network requires 
the establishment of the desired network in a virtual environment. Currently, PCTE offers 
automated solutions to build and configure virtual networks. However, there are a variety 
of mechanisms available to interface with PCTE’s networking tool. Such mechanisms 
include a variety of scripting languages and API tools available to process the CMD and 
interface with PCTE. The next chapter discusses the requirements and methodology to 
develop a runtime environment that will interface with PCTE to automate CMD replay. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
One of the principal goals of our automated cyber operation mission data replay 
(ACOMDR) application is to be both mission agnostic and data-type agnostic, which 
renders the ACOMDR application an interoperable tool with applicability to both OCO 
and DCO missions using a broad range of software to collect the corresponding CMD. To 
be effective, an ACOMDR tool embedded within PCTE must work uniformly for current 
and future offensive, defensive, and training cyber mission environments. However, every 
cyber mission is inherently unique. Given the high degree of variability that surrounds 
every mission, we can safely assume that both the data collection tools and data types 
collected will vary. Additionally, we can assume that the volume of data collected will also 
significantly vary from mission to mission. The requirements imposed by these 
assumptions introduce many issues that must be addressed in the design of the system, 
where a successful resolution of these issues results in an interoperable system that is 
relevant to the entire CMF. 
In this chapter, we outline the design of our ACOMDR application that replays 
network traffic in a digital twin environment. Key components of the application include 
data structure and processing, database management, an event manager, virtualization 
infrastructure, and runtime environment (RTE). In the following sections, we discuss each 
of these components in detail. Finally, we will conclude by outlining the key requirements 
necessary to replay cyber mission data (CMD) in a simulated network environment. 
B. ACOMDR APPLICATION DESIGN 
The conceptual model of the ACOMDR application, depicted in Figure 3, provides 
a high-level overview of the foundational interactions and organization of the application. 
The intent is to host the ACOMDR application within the PCTE infrastructure, rendering 
the ACOMDR application available to all the CMF. The conceptual model can be broken 
down into eight descriptive steps that are discussed in detail. 
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Figure 3. ACOMDR application conceptual model 
1. Cyber Mission Data Collection 
The first step in the ACOMDR conceptual model is to collect the CMD. The intent 
is not to collect mission data with this model, but to build an application that processes 
already collected mission data. The collection of mission data is not trivial and needs to be 
considered during the design of the ACOMDR application. Just as the performance of an 
automobile relies on the quality of the fuel, the performance of the ACOMDR application 
relies on the quality of the input log data. Careful consideration must be placed on the 
manner in which the input data is processed, as the data collection is an external function 
beyond the control of the ACOMDR application. Given the assumption that there will be 
no live connection between the virtual and physical network components, as the ACOMDR 
tool is designed to function with data that has already been collected and stored in a data 
repository, there will be no twinning process or feedback cycle readily available between 
our two abstractions. Nevertheless, we desire as much as possible, a digital twin instance 
of the target network within our virtual infrastructure. Therefore, the fidelity of our digital 
environment is a variable dependent on the quality and type of collected log data. 
In an ideal scenario, network specifications would be provided for the 
corresponding CMD. This scenario is advantageous in that the fidelity of the digital twin 
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network is independent of the type and quality of the CMD. However, network 
specifications are not always available (as with OCO operating outside of friendly 
networks) or provided. Given a scenario where network specifications are not available, 
we can retain the capability of replaying CMD by developing functionality to extract 
network specifications form the provided CMD in order to instantiate a digital twin 
network. 
Given the end state of a high-fidelity virtual representation of a physical network 
environment which will process the data, the design of our software needs to maintain a 
degree of modularity, flexibility, and scalability to process increasing amounts and types 
of log data to support the needed fidelity of the virtual environment. In other words, the 
application needs to produce the highest fidelity replay, independently of the data quality. 
In certain circumstances, assumptions can be made about missing information within a 
dataset in order to produce sufficient results, nevertheless high quality CMD should be 
pursued to the fullest possibility. 
As the ACOMDR application is designed to replay network traffic in a digital twin 
network, we can narrow the scope of desired mission data to network traffic log data 
captured during a cyber mission. There are currently a variety of software applications 
designed to monitor and capture network traffic, including IDS and IPS platforms such as 
Snort, Zeek, and Suricata. Each of these applications monitors or captures packets, or a 
portion of a packet, traversing a network to assimilate data for analysis. 
2. Cyber Mission Data Sourcing 
The collection of CMD in the second step of the ACOMDR model is a distributed 
process that is extremely circumstantial. Thus, it is necessary to establish repositories for 
collected CMD that can store the various data collected throughout the CMF. One such 
repository utilized by MARFORCYBER is Big Data Platform-Cyber Hunt & Analytics 
Operation System (BDP-CHAOS). BDP-CHAOS is accessible via a web browser, much 
like PCTE, and is designed to host a broad spectrum of data for analysis and training 
purposes. To facilitate a non-discriminatory analysis of data, BDP-CHAOS uses a data 
normalization process during ingestion. The ingestion process normalizes data types by 
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using the Elastic Common Schema (ECS), an open source data specification that uses a 
common set of fields in order to normalize event data, while also incorporating the 
capability to introduce custom fields as necessary. 
Given the variability in network monitoring applications, and to increase the degree 
of interoperability of the ACOMDR application, we use mission data that has been ingested 
and stored in BDP-CHAOS under the ECS. Using a normalized data schema for our 
ACOMDR application facilitates a highly versatile ACOMDR tool capable of supporting 
multiple different data types and origins. This capability requires increased mapping prior 
to data ingestion to be successful. For our initial program development, we opted to use 
Zeek log data that has undergone ingestion into an ECS database. Zeek logs such as 
conn.log, http.log, and dhcp.log enable extraction of information such as network 
configurations, hosts, and event information, which can then be used to build our digital 
twin network and replay event traffic. This yields an initial capability to replay CMD 
captured using the Zeek application. Incorporation of subsequent data captured from other 
(non-Zeek) IDS/IPS applications requires additional front-end mapping and validation.  
3. ACOMDR UI 
The third step in the ACOMDR conceptual model consists of the application user 
interface (UI). Via the PCTE web portal, a user will be able to navigate to the ACOMDR 
applet hosted on the PCTE portal and within the PCTE infrastructure. In step three, a user 
must provide a dataset for processing. There are two primary approaches to accomplishing 
how the application will process the data: pointing to data housed within the PCTE 
infrastructure, or an API call to an external source. Utilizing a pointer within PCTE would 
require that the mission data be already stored on PCTE resources. In order to have a 
minimal impact on the PCTE resources, decrease frequency of large data transfers over 
multiple networks, and increase interoperability, we anticipate developing the program to 
facilitate making API calls to separate external data repositories. 
4. Data Processing 
The fourth step in the ACOMDR conceptual model is to process the targeted data. 
The goal of processing the mission data is twofold: extract the network configurations to 
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build the digital twin network, and build a chronological event matrix. A foundational Zeek 
log type that enables correlating events across log types is the connection log, or conn.log. 
This grouping of data fields is designed to act as an initial overview and is more beneficial 
when combined with additional Zeek logs. However, it is useful to establish a 
chronological record of connections to build our event matrix and identify nodes. Some 
key data fields from the Zeek conn.log include: 
• “ts” – time of the first packet 
• “uid” – unique identifier for the specific connection 
• “id.XXXX_X” – connections 4-tuple 
• “proto” – transport layer protocol 
• “service” – application protocol 
• “conn_state” – 13 possible variables defining state of connection 
We can build a more complete picture of the network and corresponding traffic 
when the conn.log data fields are further refined in conjunction with subsequent Zeek logs. 
The “uid” data field is an artifact of the Zeek application that helps to identify a single 
connection. 
a. Network Configuration 
Extracting the network configurations will primarily rely on information tabulated 
from the Zeek dhcp.log and dns.log data fields. The dhcp.log enables us to correlate media 
access control (MAC) addresses to dynamically and statically assigned internet protocol 
(IP) addresses. Identification of a MAC address is particularly useful as it is composed of 
two key pieces of information: the organizationally unique identifier (OUI), which 
identifies the card’s manufacturer, and the network interface card (NIC), which is unique 
to a specific device. Additionally, extracting the MAC address of a device is desirable as 
it enables us to identify possible IP number reuse and make assumptions on devices on the 
target network. The dhcp.log also enables us to identify the gateway routers and infer the 
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corresponding subnet mask. Additional information from the dhcp.log can include machine 
hostname and connection state. 
Another useful grouping of data fields originates from the Zeek dns.log. The 
dns.log helps to provide an additional layer of clarity by correlating IP addresses to domain 
names and record types (AAAA, A, MX, etc.). The dns.log can help to distinguish between 
the various end devices by identifying a device as a specific type of server. 
b. Events 
In addition to extracting network specifications, the CMD must be processed to 
extract events that transpired between the various network nodes. Given that the purpose 
of the ACOMDR application is to replay the events of a cyber mission, to enable CMF 
personnel to better visualize the events that took place, we need to first compile a list of 
events, and then aggregate additional information about each event to better depict what 
happened. For example, if node A visited a website hosted by server B, we want to 
categorize that as an event or even multiple events depending on the traffic generated. We 
can leverage the Zeek uid data field as a primary key during log processing, allowing us to 
distinguish between a new event and additional information pertaining to an existing event. 
5. Relational Database 
The fifth step of the ACOMDR conceptual model represents its data store. Many 
relational—and potentially non-relational—database models can be used with the 
ACOMDR application. Given the high probability of CMD being well-structured, it is 
natural to gravitate towards a relational database, with its highly structured schema. 
Common SQL databases such as MySQL, PostgreSQL, and SQLite are mature products 
that all have a high degree of compatibility with common programming languages. We 
elected to utilize MySQL as it is open source, interoperable, and scalable, and it supports 
both relational and non-relational database structures [31].  
Figure 4 depicts a high-level conceptual model of the relational database schema 
we incorporated into the ACOMDR application. The Connection entity in Figure 4 contains 
the Zeek uid attribute as the primary key. As each uid attribute describes a single 
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connection, it can be referenced throughout multiple log entries as a point of continuity. 
We can use this key to quickly summarize the number of events and nodes within the scope 
of the dataset. The Events entity uses a timestamp as the primary key. Zeek structures logs 
in a manner whereby multiple timestamp records may exist for a single uid. Each Events 
record will compile all data relevant to that specific uid, timestamp pairing. Finally, the 
Nodes entity will compile all data that can be correlated with a specific node. In the event 
of duplicate IP address, and in the absence of a distinguishing MAC address, a duplicate 
node record will be made. 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual relational database schematic 
From this database schema, we will be able to identify all nodes that participate in 
a connection. Due to the nature of Zeek data, the ACOMDR application was designed to 
capture and build a network of endpoint devices. Identification and mapping of midpoint 
devices, such as routers and switches, requires processing additional forms of mission data. 
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6. Network Builder Module 
The sixth step of the ACOMDR conceptual model represents the Network Builder, 
which builds the digital twin network. The ACOMDR application can accomplish this 
through API calls to the virtualization infrastructure hosted within PCTE. As previously 
discussed, PCTE hosts a robust virtualization infrastructure capable of running a broad 
variety of VMs. 
The Network Builder module of the ACOMDR application will be the primary 
component that orchestrates the processes necessary to interface with the PCTE hypervisor 
and ACOMDR relational database. With regard to virtual network construction, the 
Network Builder must pass configuration parameters for each node to the hypervisor for 
node creation. Additionally, the Network Builder must pass information on the logical 
topology of the network. 
7. Event Manager Module 
In the seventh step of the ACOMDR conceptual model, the program iterates 
through traffic events on the newly established digital twin network. The Event Manager 
module of the ACOMDR application acts as the primary interface with the Puppet 
platform, which automates this process. Puppet is a software configuration management 
tool already established within the PCTE architecture [32]. An open source orchestration 
tool developed by Puppet, Bolt, enables automation of deployed VMs [33]. The Event 
Manager module leverages the appropriate Puppet module to automate the execution of 
events in the digital twin network. 
8. Replay Visualization 
The final step of the ACOMDR conceptual model is for the program to display the 
network traffic to the user. This step is at the crux of the ACOMDR application. An 
application that perfectly executes the functions described in the earlier steps, but then fails 
to deliver a clear visual depiction of those events, provides little value to the CMF user. 
Additionally, this step offers the developers the most flexibility and creativity within the 
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ACOMDR project. As such, we will define both the target end state of the application and 
the iterative methodology we intend to adopt to achieve those goals. 
There are two principal approaches to delivering a comprehensive and interactive 
perspective to users. The first approach leverages the existing capabilities intrinsic to 
PCTE. By means of APIs to established PCTE visualization infrastructure, there exists the 
possibility to display a logical network topology to the user of the digital twin network. 
From this topological view, we can then iterate through the events by highlighting the 
corresponding nodes and displaying information regarding the type of connection. The 
second approach would be to develop a visualization infrastructure specifically for the 
ACOMDR application. The second approach leverages the developer’s creativity and 
expands upon the ACOMDR application’s UI module. While this may impose a larger 
footprint on PCTE infrastructure, it will facilitate tailoring the UI to the ACOMDR 
application. Development of the UI via the second approach can be effectively 
accomplished by means of JavaScript (JS) or PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP). 
JS is a lightweight, interpreted, object-oriented scripting language commonly 
implemented on the client side of web browser environments. Because JS is an interpreted 
language, it does not need to be compiled at runtime. JS is attractive for website developers 
as it permits a degree of user interactivity with the website that traditional HTML cannot 
provide, however, without the Node.js RTE, JS will require a user to have the appropriate 
plug-ins for their web browser [34]. The Node.js RTE allows for the web server to process 
the JS code, as opposed to the client’s browser, and removes the dependency for different 
languages between the client and server. An important distinction between JS and Java is 
that JS is not part of the Java platform; they are disjoint entities [35], [36]. 
PHP is an open-source HTML-embedded interpreted scripting language commonly 
employed for web development. In website applications, PHP is processed on the server 
and the resulting HTML is returned to a client’s browser to create dynamic webpage 
content. Additionally, PHP can run on common operating systems rendering it platform-
independent [37]. 
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For the scope of this thesis, we focus on the development of steps 1–6. Therefore, 
we opted to adopt a simple CLI for the UI in order to diagnose and validate the ACOMDR 
application. However, by planning for a more robust UI during the development of steps 
1–6, we can set conditions for corresponding future work on the ACOMDR application. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the conceptual model for the design of the ACOMDR 
application. The ACOMDR application consists of three modules and a database developed 
using the Java platform. The ACOMDR application is designed to be hosted from within 
the PCTE infrastructure and allow users to process already collected mission data within 
the PCTE environment. The ACOMDR application will enable connections to external 
data repositories, which enables the PCTE to process collected mission data for user 
visualization, training, and future mission rehearsals. 
In the next chapter, we discuss the implementation of steps one through six for the 
ACOMDR application. The objective was to source Zeek CMD from BDP-CHAOS in 
order to extract a network spec and instantiate a network within PCTE. 
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IV. TEST SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
Chapter III described the MDR application framework for replaying CMD by 
accomplishing eight sequential steps. This chapter describes a proof-of-concept 
implementation of steps 1-6 of the framework, culminating in the extraction of network 
specifications for subsequent future implementation within PCTE. The goal is to outline 
the step-by-step approach we implemented to validate this proof-of-concept model. 
A. OVERVIEW 
If CMD does not have a corresponding network specification, as is the case with 
the CMD used for the development of this program, the first step to replay the CMD is to 
extract a network specification and use it to instantiate the twin network on PCTE. The 
proof-of-concept ACOMDR program we developed accomplishes this task by utilizing two 
relational databases to process the CMD and produces a “YAML Ain't Markup Language” 
(YAML) network specification file for subsequent network instantiation (YAML will be 
described in further detail in Section D of this chapter). 
The program was developed under the assumption that the MDR application will 
be hosted within the PCTE infrastructure. As such, it is sensible to design and implement 
the MDR application in a manner that facilitates efficient incorporation within the PCTE 
architecture. Given that the PCTE is an infrastructure composed of many COTS products, 
we found it prudent to implement a methodology that supports interoperability between 
many systems and platforms. The current design of the PCTE suggests that developing the 
MDR application in Java would be most beneficial for subsequent incorporation into the 
PCTE given Java’s portability. 
B. ENVIRONMENT 
The application design uses the following environment: 
• OS: Windows 10 Home Version 21H1 
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• Integrated development environment (IDE): Eclipse IDE for Java 
Developers Version 2021-06 
• Java: Version 15.0.2 
• Java Development Kit (JDK): Version 15.0.2 
• SnakeYAML: Version 1.25 
• MySQL Connector/J: Version 8.0.25 
• MySQL: Version 8.0.25 
C. DATABASE 
Our Automated Cyber Operations Mission Data Replay (ACOMDR) application 
was developed using two disjoint MySQL databases hosted on the same local server. The 
first database simply contains CMD in an unaltered state, as it was ingested into the 
MySQL database immediately after download from BDP-CHAOS. We will refer to CMD 
in the first database as raw CMD. The second database contains CMD that is specifically 
selected and aggregated by the ACOMDR application, or processed CMD. Figure 5 




Figure 5. ACOMDR development using two databases 
The ACOMDR application database, depicted as RDBMS 2, was developed to 
allow the program to quickly characterize two aspects of the corresponding CMD. First, 
the program needs to produce a network specification from the CMD. This was 
accomplished using tables that catalog the connections made and nodes involved. Second, 
the program needs to replay the events that transpired in the CMD. This was accomplished 
using an events table.  
1. Database 1 
As previously discussed, BDP-CHAOS is a MARFORCYBER data repository that 
houses data from the Marine Corps Enterprise Network. The BDP-CHAOS platform 
provides users with a capability to visualize data from many IPS/IDS sources as well as to 
query various datatypes and timeframes. As such, we were able to make queries for a 
unique CMD set for varying timeframes. For developmental purposes, we downloaded four 
CMD datasets, each with different dates and durations. As BDP-CHAOS uses ECS, the 
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fields of each dataset vary depending on the corresponding original Zeek logs. A summary 
of major Zeek logs found within each dataset is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Primary Zeek logs in datasets 1-4 
 
 
The purpose of Database 1 is to maintain tables for each of the four datasets from 
BDP-CHAOS, downloaded as comma-separated value (CSV) files. MySQL Workbench 
offers an efficient Table Data Import Wizard tool that enables users to quickly create tables 
within a MySQL database from local CSV files. All fields in the datasets were imported 
into MySQL as text to prevent formatting errors between MySQL’s import wizard and the 
cell values. Figure 6 depicts the four datasets imported into our local MySQL database 
where each dataset exists as a table containing the various fields. 
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Figure 6. Datasets downloaded and imported into MySQL 
2. Database 2 
The second database exists within the ACOMDR application. When ACOMDR is 
deployed within the PCTE infrastructure, the application will require a local MySQL server 
to process and house the necessary data to replay the CMD. This second database contains 
the connection table, the nodes table, and the events table, whose entities were defined in 
Chapter III. 
The connection table aggregates the uid, timestamp, protocol, transport layer, 
service, and log type of every connection made within the CMD dataset. Null values are 
allowed in all imported fields and each connection is indexed using a local auto-
incremented connection number field. 
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The nodes table aggregates the IP address, MAC address, host name, and host type 
from the CMD. Null values are allowed in all imported fields and each node is indexed 
using a local auto-incremented node number field. 
The events table aggregates the timestamp, uid, connection duration, originating 
IP address, originating port, destination IP address, destination port, application layer 
protocol, and transport layer from the CMD. Null values are allowed in all imported fields 
and each event is indexed using a local auto-incremented event number field. The tables 
necessary for the ACOMDR application database are depicted in Figure 7 with character 
spaces detailed within the parenthesis. 
 
Figure 7. ACOMDR database tables 
D. PROGRAM 
The proof-of-concept ACOMDR application was designed in Eclipse using the 
MySQL Connector/J, which is the Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) driver that 
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implements the JDBC API. The following sub-sections describe the major components of 
our Java application, database interface, and resulting output. 
1. MySQL Connection 
To have the ACOMDR application connect to the local MySQL server, we 
developed a MySQLAccess class with the ACOMDR program. This class connects to both 
the raw CMD database (Database 1) and the ACOMDR database (Database 2) to extract 
the data necessary to populate the three tables in the ACOMDR database. 
For the MySQLAccess class to access the databases, we first had to download the 
latest version of the Connector/J JAR file. Once downloaded, we mapped the Java Build 
Path to the external Connector/J JAR file. The JDBC API allows for quick and efficient 
connections to MySQL databases by obtaining a Connection instance from the 
DriverManager. A modified summary of our MySQLAccess class connection 
methodology is depicted in Figure 8. We connected to each database by declaring unique 
connection variables (server location, username, and password) for each database, depicted 
as lines 4-6 and 9-11 in Figure 8, as well as declaring two null connection instances outside 
of our methods, as was done in lines 14 and 15 in Figure 8. However, unlike Figure 8, a 
connection to a database is only established within a method and is closed before returning 
from the method in order to manage the connections. Therefore, each method begins with 
a try block establishing the connection, as depicted in line 17 of Figure 8, followed by 
prepared statements to interact with the MySQL databases. 
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Figure 8. Connection to MySQL databases 1 and 2 
2. Processing ACOMDR Data 
To process the raw CMD stored in Database 1, we defined seven methods in the 
MySQLAccess class. These public methods are called from the UI class and each 
performs a unique function: 
• ArrayList<String> query_tables(): takes no parameters and 
returns an ArrayList of strings. This method returns a dynamic array of the 
tables in Database 1. As the tables in Database 2 are fixed, the method 
does not need to establish a connection or interact with Database 2. 
• void wipeTbl(String table): takes a Database 2 table name 
(string) as a parameter and has the return voided. This method has the 
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capability to truncate tables in Database 2, which retains the table fields 
but deletes all rows in the table. 
• void build_con_tbl(String table): takes a Database 1 table 
name (string) as a parameter and has the return voided. This method 
populates the connection table in Database 2 with values from the desired 
raw CMD in Database 1. 
• void build_node_tbl(String table): takes a Database 1 table 
name (string) as a parameter and has the return voided. This method 
populates the node table in Database 2 with values from the desired raw 
CMD in Database 1. 
• void build_events_tbl(String table): takes a Database 1 
table name (string) as a parameter and has the return voided. This method 
populates the events table in Database 2 with values from the desired raw 
CMD in Database 1. 
• void sql_close(): takes no parameters and has the return voided. 
This method closes any open connections and is used internally within the 
class so is private. 
• ResultSet sql_pull(String port): takes a port number as a 
parameter and returns the ResultSet . This method queries Database 1 
for information necessary to build the network specification document and 
returns a ResultSet, which is the table of data that is generated from 
executing prepared statements or statements. 
3. User Interface 
Next we developed a simple CLI to function as the UI for the ACOMDR program. 
We accomplished this by developing a UI class within our ACOMDR Java project. The UI 




Figure 9. ACOMDR UI main menu 
From the main menu, users are directed to one of five sub-menus based on their 
choice (the sixth option exits the program). From these sub-menus, users are asked to make 
various additional selections or confirm their selections. Options 1-3 of the main menu 
direct the user to identify a source table from Database 1 that the application will use to 
populate the tables in Database 2. The sub-menu for the first option to build the connection 
table is depicted in Figure 10 (the sub-menus for the second and third options of the main 
menu are similar to this one). 
 
Figure 10. ACOMDR UI build connection table sub-menu 
The sub-menu for option 4 to truncate a table directs the user to identify a table to 
truncate from Database 2, as depicted in Figure 11. We have restricted the ability of users to 
only truncate tables within Database 2 to avoid any accidental erasing of raw CMD. Future 
implementation of this method could be automated and called once a user exits the application. 
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Figure 11. ACOMDR UI truncate table sub-menu 
All user input commands are verified prior to passing the commands to any other 
methods or classes. In the event a user inputs an incorrect command, such as a letter 
character vice an integer, they are either redirected to the main menu or asked to try again. 
In the event a user inputs the incorrect name for one of the various tables, we follow a 
similar procedure of verifying the input by comparing it to queried table names from 
Database 1 or hard-coded table names for Database 2. 
4. Formatting YAML Output File 
The network specification is written to a YAML file by means of the SnakeYAML 
package. YAML is a readable markup language that is commonly used in place of 
extensible markup language (XML) for configuration files. The basic structure of YAML 
is key-value pairing in a standardized format. 
The format of the YAML network specification file is configured in accordance 
with the Oasis Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Applications (TOSCA) 
Simple Profile in YAML Version 1.2 standard. We have developed a YAML_Writer 
class, a custom representer class, and three additional object classes that collectively build 
the YAML network specification file. Additionally, we leveraged the sql_pull method 
in the MySQLAccess class that takes a Database 2 table name as a string parameter and 
returns the ResultSet from the MySQL query. From this ResultSet, we are able to 
iterate through the database table information to populate the network specification objects. 
A summary of the YAML output architecture is depicted in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. ACOMDR YAML output architecture 
We have defined three methods within the YAML writer class that allow us to 
configure and produce the network specification file. The WriteYaml method allows us 
to set certain snakeYAML dumper options when writing the YAML file. This method also 
allows us to define the path for the resulting YAML output file and makes individual 
method calls to the two other private methods to write the YAML file. The remaining two 
methods are a network object method and a node object method. Each of these methods 
make calls to MySQLAccess class in order to query Database 2. From the returned 
ResultSet, these methods call the network specification object classes and set the 
objects in accordance with the database. 
The custom representer class, which extends the SnakeYAML representer class, 
allows us to configure specific formatting options regarding the writing YAML file. We 
have configured the custom representer to omit null values, class tags, and adopt the class 
order of objects. 
The remaining three object classes contain get and set for methods for all the private 
variables defined within the three classes. The variables correlate to the TOSCA standard 
for nodes and network information. The node and network information variables are 
depicted in Figure 13 and Figure 14, respectively. 
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Figure 13. TOSCA node type grammar. Source: [38]. 
Figure 14. TOSCA network info grammar. Source: [38]. 
E. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the ACOMDR application we developed a three-point testing
scheme that we used to evaluate the efficiency and suitability of the application. We first 
evaluated the time necessary to build the connection, events, and node tables from three 
increasingly larger datasets. Secondly, we evaluated the time required to build a network 
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specification for varying scopes of data. And finally, we evaluated the suitability of the 
network specification produced. We did not consider the time necessary to download the 
CSV data from BDP-CHAOS as we assumed the final version of the ACOMDR application 
would query the data via API calls. 
1. Database Table Population
The time necessary to build the connection, node, and events tables in the 
ACOMDR database (Database 2) varied significantly depending on the size of the source 
data tables (Database 1). Table 3 depicts the sizes in megabytes of three source tables that 
were tested by the application, the average build times of each table in seconds, and the 
ratio of the build time by size and build time by number of rows. 
Table 3. Size of source data in Database 1 
We saw an exponential increase in the time required to process the source data as 
it increased in size. The time to populate each table is depicted in the left graph of Figure 
15, and the relative time to populate each table (seconds divided by number of rows) is 
depicted in the right graph of Figure 15. 
Figure 15. Time to populate data in Database 2 (left) and time divided by 
table rows (right) 
Source Data Columns Rows Table size (MB) Build Time (sec) sec / size sec / row
cpt_data 74 6,899 5.50 29.33 5.333 0.004251824
cpt_data2 43 48,372 26.60 300.67 11.303 0.006215717
cpt_data3 179 360,885 267.00 4313.67 16.156 0.011953023
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Our results found that the current structure of processing entire source datasets to 
extract the necessary information is inefficient. Much of the source data, retained in 
Database 1, is superfluous and currently only serves to inhibit the processing of CMD. 
2. Network Specification Population 
We evaluated the creation of the network specification file using a varying number 
of nodes to build the document. Figure 16 depicts the near linear correlation between the 
number of nodes used to build the network specification document and the time required 
in seconds to build a network specification document from the data. From our analysis, we 
projected that the ACOMDR application would take approximately 11.7 hours to process 
all 38,180 unique node instances within our various datasets if directed to process all nodes. 
 
Figure 16. Time to build network specification document 
The time necessary to develop a comprehensive network specification is certainly 
significant. However, additional data processing is necessary to evaluate the node types, 
interfaces, and connections. 
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3. Network Specification Suitability 
The suitability of the network specification is currently untested. An ideal 
evaluation would consist of using the ACOMDR YAML network specification file as the 
source file for the PCTE to instantiate a virtual network. However, we were unable to 
complete such an evaluation due to time constraints. In lieu of an evaluation within PCTE, 
we evaluated the network specification from the TOSCA standards and assumptions we 
made in developing the ACOMDR application. 
The TOSCA standards are very broad and incorporate a high degree of flexibility 
and variability. As such, it is likely that the network specification produced by the 
ACOMDR application lacks sufficient mapping to the variables utilized within the PCTE 
infrastructure. 
The current network specification produced by the ACOMDR application is limited 
in scope to port 80 traffic. We hardcoded SQL queries to identify traffic destined for a port 
80 IP address. We inferred that these connections were made from a compute node to a 
web server, and can identify IP address for each. From that inference, we populated the 
network specification to detail web servers and the nodes connecting to the web servers. 
From the CLI, users can specify the number of connections to use in building the network 
specification file. Our program then iterated through the appropriate tables in Database 2 
via a MySQL query method available in the MySQLAccess class and built the network 
specification from the results. 
While extremely limited in scope, this network specification serves to validate that 
we can extract some network information from Zeek CMD. Further correlations and 
mapping are necessary to develop a more robust network specification. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the virtual environment, development, results, and analysis 
of the proof-of-concept ACOMDR application. Our testing determined that the ACOMDR 
application can process CMD and produce a network specification document. Our testing 
also concluded that the current version of the ACOMDR application produces a low fidelity 
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network specification and incurs significant delays in processing CMD due to the large 
amount of superfluous data contained within the database. The current ACOMDR 
application is a successful proof-of-concept that requires additional development and 
refinements to increase the fidelity of network specifications and a more efficient data 
processing mechanism. The next chapter discusses the overall conclusions of this research 
as well as potential areas for future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The primary goal of this research was to explore the capability of replaying cyber 
mission data (CMD) within the PCTE infrastructure through the development of an 
application. We developed a proof-of-concept tool called the Automated Cyber Operations 
Mission Data Replay (ACOMDR) application that can process Zeek CMD and produce a 
network specification. We were able to identify that the primary limitation to replaying 
CMD within PCTE is the lack of readily available network specifications that can correlate 
to CMD. A crucial first step in the development of the ACOMDR application was to be 
able to process the CMD and produce a network specification of the highest possible 
fidelity. 
The ACOMDR application was designed to integrate within the continually 
evolving PCTE infrastructure and to provide enhanced visualization of cyberspace 
operations to the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The current ACOMDR application serves as a proof-of-concept for the processing 
of CMD to extract network specifications. Additional data processing or other types of 
CMD are necessary to establish more correlations between the CMD and node or network 
parameters to build network specifications of higher fidelity. In the following sections we 
provide answers to our specific research questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
How can the relevant network specifications be extracted from log data to 
instantiate a digital twin network? 
We have successfully developed a proof-of-concept tool that processes CMD to 
extract network specifications for web servers and nodes attempting to connect to web 
servers. We have determined that, in order to extract network specifications from original 
Zeek CMD, it is necessary to develop a list of assumptions regarding node characteristics. 
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For example, if a node is sending traffic from an ephemeral port to a well-known port, we 
can assume that the sending node is a user computer node, and the receiving node is a type 
that corresponds to the well-known port number. Additional assumptions will need to be 
made about each node as development continues, such as the hardware characteristics, 
operating system, and other capabilities, properties, and attributes in accordance with the 
TOSCA standards. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
How can log data be converted to scripts to be executed on a digital twin network? 
The processing of CMD logs can be accomplished with a software solution, which, 
in turn, will interface with existing automation in place within the PCTE to control the 
replay of events on the digital twin network. The software solution we developed 
successfully processes CMD and produces a network specification, however further 
development of the ACOMDR application is required for proper to interfacing with the 
PCTE’s existing capabilities, such as the Puppet module or event visualization service. Our 
current software solution is structured in a manner that will enable further investigation 
and development to produce a software tool that has the capability to interface with the 
existing automation tool within the PCTE to replay cyber mission data. 
What are the desirable features of a run-time environment to control the execution 
of cyber mission scripts? 
With respect to implementation within PCTE, we have determined that the Puppet 
module is the appropriate feature to control the execution of events within the digital twin 
network. Further development of a software solution to interface with Puppet is necessary 
to facilitate the replay of events within a PCTE network. Additional research is also 
recommended to determine the feasibility of utilizing Puppet outside of the PCTE to 
control the execution of events within a network. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research we have conducted has identified multiple areas where further 
research would serve to improve the fidelity and capability of our ACOMDR application. 
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The areas described below are not all-inclusive, but will answer necessary questions 
regarding the scope and capability of future development. 
1. Scope of Ingestion Data 
The proof-of-concept ACOMDR application was developed using Zeek data, 
which captures header fields of select packets between end devices and stores them as log 
files. Using Zeek CMD to build a network specification introduces limitations to the scope 
of data and fidelity of the network specification. 
We recommend expanding the scope of ingestion data to include additional 
datatypes to research the possibility of increasing the fidelity of the induced network 
specification and subsequent digital twin network. BDP-CHAOS hosts other datatypes that 
may better describe network boundaries and traffic beyond a local LAN. 
2. BDP-CHAOS Connectors 
The ACOMDR application currently does not have any connectors to external data 
repositories. Establishing a connector to external data repositories, such as BDP-CHAOS, 
will significantly increase the capability of the ACOMDR application. 
A connection to BDP-CHAOS, and modification to the UI, can allow users to 
directly query BDP-CHAOS for CMD. Most importantly, a connection to BDP-CHAOS 
would allow the ACOMDR application to pursue the specific attributes of CMD that build 
higher fidelity network specifications. For example, the ACOMDR application would be 
much more efficient if the application had the capability to query for specific fields of Zeek 
CMD in BDP-CHOAS, such as connection logs or DHCP logs. This would decrease the 
amount of superfluous CMD ingested and streamline the development of network 
specifications that would allow us to drop the first database (Database 1) housing raw 
CMD, decreasing the overhead of the application. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to establish additional connectors to other BDP’s 
within the CMF community. Additional connectors would increase the level of 
interoperability and functionality of PCTE capabilities in accordance with the JCWA. 
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3. UI 
The ACOMDR application currently has a simple CLI. The application could be 
further refined by developing and integrating a robust GUI within the application to display 
dynamic views of digital twin network topology and iterate through cyber events that occur 
on the digital twin network. An ideal GUI would include an interactive display that allows 
for customizable/interactive replay of cyber mission. PCTE currently has the capabilities 
to produce user visualizations of events that have occurred within the PCTE infrastructure. 
4. YAML Processing 
The ACOMDR application currently produces the YAML network specification 
through a manual formatting process. It would be more efficient and productive to research 
additional methodologies to producing YAML output files. For example, reading a YAML 
network specification could allow the program to map Java objects to the YAML attributes. 
Subsequent programming could leverage the automated mapping to quickly produce a 
YAML file with the same mapping schema. 
5. Network Specification Fidelity 
The fidelity of the network specification could be significantly increased through 
additional mapping and queries of the source data. In order for the ACOMDR application 
to make better assumptions, or to decrease the necessity to make assumptions, further 
processing of the source data needs to be accomplished. Such processing should include 
making additional correlations between source data fields and node profiles. 
6. ACOMDR Database Schema 
The current ACOMDR database schema defines the Connection, Events, and 
Nodes tables. This schema could be modified to better support defining the network 
specification by creating tables for the various node types. A table should be created for 
each of the various node types, such has web servers, mail servers, domain name servers, 
and user compute nodes. Data processing should include querying the CMD for well-
known port numbers and ephemeral port numbers to populate the various node type tables. 
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This schema would better support making inferences on the node types and network 
environment to build a higher fidelity network specification. 
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APPENDIX.  ZEEK LOG TYPES AND ECS MAPPING 
Table 4. Zeek log types and ECS mapping 
Zeek Log Description 
capture_loss.log analysis of missing traffic 
conn.log stateful (TCP) and stateless (UDP) protocols 
dhcp.log Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol activity 
dns.log Domain Name System activity 
dpd.log Dynamic protocol detection for protocols on ports beyond those 
used as standard services 
files.log record of observed files 
ftp.log FTP activity 
http.log clear-text HTTP or exposed HTTPS 
irc.log Internet Relay Chat activity 
known_certs.log SSL/TLS certificate information 
known_hosts.log entries for when a new system joins the local network 
known_services.log entries for when a system offers a new service on the local 
network 
notice.log inspection-worthy situations 
ntp.log Network Time Protocol activity 
pe.log portable executable 
rdp.log Remote Desktop Protocol activity 
reporter.log internal warnings and errors 
SMB Logs commonly associated with Microsoft Windows 
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smtp.log email traffic using ports 25, 465, and 587 TCP 
software.log details on applications operated by the hosts 
ssh.log details about SSH sessions 
ssl.log parsed TLS traffic (typically includes HTTPS) 
traceroute.log script that tries to identify traceroute activity 
tunnel.log identify encapsulated traffic (IPv6 within IPv4) 
weird.log anomalies and unknown records 
x509.log certificates exchange details from TLS negotiations 
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